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COMMENT
Shoemaker v. Handel: Alcohol and Drug
Testing and the Pervasive Regulation
Exception to the Fourth
Amendment's Administrative
Search Warrant Requirement
Introduction
Alcohol and drug abuse is a problem of enormous proportions.
Drug abuse alone costs American society nearly sixty billion dollars an-
nually.I In a rare joint address to the nation, President Reagan and his
wife, Nancy Reagan, warned of a "drug and alcohol abuse epidemic in
this country."2
Drug testing has emerged as an important tool to combat drug mis-
use in the workplace. On September 15, 1986, the President ordered the
heads of executive agencies to establish mandatory programs to test fed-
eral employees in "sensitive positions" for drug use.3 The military has
tested its active duty personnel for several years.4 In the private sector,
employee drug abuse has prompted such companies as IBM, Greyhound,
and American Airlines to screen all job applicants with a urinalysis test
to detect drug consumption;5 in fact, approximately one-third of For-
I. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG
ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME 6 n.3 (1986) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION] (citing a 1984 government-commissioned study which used 1983 data). See also
id. app. G, at 5-6 ("costs" may include lost productivity, medical expenses for treatment or
rehabilitation, and expenses incurred for crime prevention, police, courts, and prisons).
2. Joint address by President Reagan and Nancy Reagan (Sept. 14, 1986), reprinted in
N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1986, at 11, col. 4. An estimated 25 million Americans have tried co-
caine, and five to six million use the drug at least once per month. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
supra note 1, at 16 (citing Cocaine Abuse and the Federal Response: Hearing Before the House
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1985) (statement of
Dr. Arnold Washton, research director, National Cocaine Hotline)). Approximately 50 to 60
million Americans have tried marijuana, of which 20 million use the drug at least once per
month. Id. at 47.
3. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32889 (1986).
4. Department of Defense Drug Abuse Testing Program, 32 C.F.R. 60 (1985).
5. Brecker, Taking Drugs on the Job, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at 2.
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tune 500 companies6 require applicants or employees to undergo such
tests.7 A presidential commission studying America's drug abuse prob-
lem recommended that all government and private employers require
their applicants and employees to take drug tests.8
The question arises whether mandatory warrantless alcohol and
drug testing of employees violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription
against unreasonable search.9 Tests required by private sector employers
absent government involvement do not implicate the Fourth Amendment
and therefore never constitute an unreasonable search. 0 However, the
6. The "Fortune 500" is a list compiled annually by FORTUNE magazine of the 500
largest United States industrial corporations.
7. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1986, at 18. See also O'Boyle, More Firms Require Employee
Drug Tests, Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1985, at 6, col. 1; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at
461 (two-thirds of 180 "Fortune 500" companies do not employ applicants who fail a drug
test, 25% fire employees who fail such a test, and 41% help employees seek treatment).
8. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 485.
9. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
10. The Supreme Court has stated:
This Court has also consistently construed [the fourth amendment] protection as
proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable "to a search or
seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an
agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmen-
tal official."
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984), quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S.
649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Therefore, legal protection for private sector em-
ployees must come from an exercise of the state's police power that limits drug testing by
private sector employers. For example, the City of San Francisco has adopted an ordinance
that provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Sec. 3300A.5 EMPLOYER PROHIBITED FROM TESTING EMPLOYEES.
No employer may demand, require, or request employees to submit to, to take or to
undergo any blood, urine, or encephalographic test in the body as a condition of
continued employment. Nothing herein shall prohibit an employer from requiring a
specific employee to submit to blood or urine testing if:
(a) the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that an employee's faculties
are impaired on the job; and
(b) the employee is in a position where such impairment presents a clear and
present danger to the physical safety of the employee, another employee or to a mem-
ber of the public; and
(c) the employer provides the employee, at the employer's expense, the opportu-
nity to have the sample tested or evaluated by [a] State licensed independent labora-
tory/testing facility and provides the employee with a reasonable opportunity to
rebut or explain the results.
In conducting those tests designed to identify the presence of chemical sub-
stances in the body, and not prohibited by this section, the employer shall ensure to
the extent feasible that the test only measures and that its records only show or make
use of information regarding chemical substances in the body which are likely to
affect the ability of the employee to perform safely his or her duties while on the job.
Under no circumstances may employers request, require or conduct random or
company-wide blood, urine or encephalographic testing.
In any action brought under this Article alleging that the employer had violated
this section, the employer shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of
Subsections (a), (b), and (c) as stated above have been satisfied.
SAN FRANCISCO, CA., POLICE CODE art. 33A, § 3300A.5 (1985).
Fourth Amendment does apply to searches conducted with government
involvement, and several courts have held unconstitutional the random
drug testing of government employees."'
In Shoemaker v. Handel,12 a federal court confronted the situation
of state-mandated warrantless alcohol and drug testing of private sector
employees in the closely regulated horse racing industry. The Shoe-
maker court deemed the testing program constitutional notwithstanding
government involvement, finding that pervasive regulation of the indus-
try brought the state alcohol and drug testing scheme within a recog-
nized exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant
requirement. 13
This Comment briefly describes the facts and decision in Shoe-
maker, then discusses the Fourth Amendment's search warrant require-
ment-its purpose, its applicability to regulatory inspections, and the
establishment and scope of its pervasive regulation exception. The rules
defining the exception are then applied de novo to the facts in Shoe-
maker. This Comment concludes that the court impermissibly expanded
the pervasive regulation exception, and thereby jeopardized the protec-
tion afforded under the search warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
I. Shoemaker v. Handel: Race Horse Jockeys Challenge
a Mandatory Warrantless Alcohol and Drug
Testing Program
The plaintiffs in Shoemaker, all professional thoroughbred race
horse jockeys, 4 brought a suit challenging the constitutionality of regu-
lations that require every official, jockey, trainer, and groom to submit to
mandatory warrantless breath' 5 and urine 16 tests. 17 A state agency, the
11. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Weinberger, No. CV486-353 (S.D.
Ga. Dec. 2, 1986) (drug testing of civilian Department of Defense employees in "critical"
positions); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Rabb, No. 86-3522 (E.D. La. Nov. 14,
1986) (United States Customs Service Workers); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, No. Civ-1-
86-389 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 1986) (fire fighters); Penny v. City of Chattanooga, No. Civ-1-86-
417 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 1986) (police department personnel); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643
F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 1986) (fire fighters).
12. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1986) (No. 86-
576) (opinion by Judge Gibbons) [hereinafter Shoemaker 111]; 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J.
1985) (opinion by Judge Brotman) [hereinafter Shoemaker 1I]; 608 F. Supp. 1151 (D.N.J.
1985) (opinion by Judge Brotman) [hereinafter Shoemaker I].
13. Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142; Shoemaker 1l, 619 F. Supp. at 1099-1100. See infra
notes 58-90 and accompanying text.
14. William Shoemaker, Angel Cordero, Jr., William Herbert McCauley, Philip Grove,
and Vincent Braccioli.
15. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13 § 70-14A.10 (1985). This regulation reads in full:
Officials, jockeys, trainers and grooms shall, when directed by the State Steward,
submit to a breathalyzer test and if the results thereof show a reading of more than
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New Jersey Racing Commission (the "Commission"), promulgated the
regulations and administers the tests.18 Under the Commission's pro-
gram, jockeys must take a breathalyzer test daily. Officials, trainers, and
grooms undergo such testing less frequently. The breathalyzer regula-
tion does not provide for the preservation of confidentiality of test re-
sults.19 The urine tests are administered under a lottery system. The
names of all jockeys participating in a particular race are placed in an
envelope, from which three to five names are selected at random. The
chosen jockeys must provide a urine sample upon completion of their last
race of the day.2° The urinalysis regulation requires that all information
acquired during the process of obtaining a urine sample, including test
results, be kept confidential, "except for their use with respect to a ruling
issued pursuant to this rule, or any administrative or judicial hearing
with regard to such a ruling."21 The alcohol and drug tests constitute
.05 percent of alcohol in the blood, such person shall not be permitted to continue his
duties. The stewards may fine or suspend any participant who records a blood alco-
hol reading of .05 percent or more. Any participant who records a reading above the
prescribed level on more than one occasion shall be subject to expulsion, or such
penalty as the stewards may deem appropriate.
16. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13 § 70-14A. 11 (1985). This regulation provides in part:
(a) No licensee or official shall use any Controlled Dangerous Substance as de-
fined in the "New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substance Act", N.J.S.A. 24:21-1, et
seq. or any prescription legend drug, unless such substance was obtained directly, or
pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a licensed physician, while acting in
the course of his professional practice. It shall be the responsibility of the official,
jockey, trainer and groom to give notice to the State Steward that he is using a Con-
trolled Dangerous Substance or prescription legend drug pursuant to a valid pre-
scription or order from a licensed practitioner when requested.
(b) Every official, jockey, trainer and groom for any race at an licensed race-
track may be subjected to a urine test, or other non-invasive fluid test at the direction
of the State Steward in a manner prescribed by the New Jersy Racing Commission.
Any official, jockey, trainer or groom who fails to submit to a urine test when re-
quested to do so by the State Steward shall be liable to the penalties provided in
N.J.A.C. 13:70-31.
17. The plaintiffs employed four theories in their challenge to the regulations: unreasona-
ble search and seizure (Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1097-1104; see also infra notes 35-39
and acccompanying text); denial of due process (Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1104-05; see
also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); denial of equal protection of the laws (Shoe-
maker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1105; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1); and invasion of privacy
(Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1105-07; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). The
district court focused on the fourth amendment claim. Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1097-
1104.
18. The New Jersey State Legislature has enacted statutes to regulate horse racing. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:5-22 to 5:5-121 (West 1973 & Supp. 1986). The Legislature established
the Commission and vested it with broad supervisory power over the industry, including the
"full power to prescribe rules, regulations and conditions under which all horse racing shall be
conducted ...." Id. at § 5:5-30.
19. Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1094.
20. Id. at 1094-95.
21. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13 § 70-14A.Il(e) (1985).
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searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2 2
Initially, the jockeys sought but failed to obtain a preliminary in-
junction to enjoin enforcement of the regulations.23 Several months later,
after a full bench hearing, the district court upheld the constitutionality
of the regulations, and again denied injunctive relief.24
The primary issue before the district court was whether state-man-
dated alcohol and drug tests, administered without individualized suspi-
cion21 to individuals in a heavily regulated industry, violate the Fourth
Amendment.26 Under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
established an administrative search warrant requirement which man-
dates that a regulatory official obtain a warrant issued upon probable
cause before conducting a search.27 The Supreme Court, however, has
recognized a narrow exception to the administrative search warrant re-
quirement: regulatory inspections of pervasively regulated industries.28
The exception applies when the state's interest in enforcing the regula-
tory scheme through warrantless search outweighs legitimate privacy ex-
22. For those cases finding that a urinalysis test constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment, see McDonnell v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1984); Division 241 Amalga-
mated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1029 (1976); Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin,
600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). For those cases holding that breathalyzer tests are
searches under the Fourth Amendment, see Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 634 F.
Supp. 1029 (D. Alaska 1986); Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985); Leslie v. State,
711 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980).
23. Shoemaker 1, 608 F. Supp. 1151 (D.N.J. 1985).
24. Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985).
25. A degree of individualized suspicion is usually required for a search or seizure to be
considered constitutional. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976).
However, a particularly strong government interest may preclude insistence on this require-
ment if safeguards limit the discretion of the official conducting the search. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968).
26. Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1097.
27. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967). See also infra notes 35-57
and accompanying text. A search warrant is:
An order in writing, issued by a justice or other magistrate, in the name of the state,
directed to a sheriff, constable, or other officer, authorizing him to search for and
seize any property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a crime, contra-
band, the fruits of a crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1211 (5th ed. 1979).
To determine whether probable cause exists in the administrative search setting, Camara
fashioned a test that balances the state's need for the search against the intrusiveness of the
search to the individual. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. Thus, probable cause is not an inflexible
concept. A greater or lesser showing of probable cause may be required, depending on the
circumstances of the search. Hence, intrusions into the human body require a higher quantum
of probable cause. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 111-12 & n.26 (1985)
(citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). See infra note 117 and accompanying
text.
28. See infra notes 58-90 and accompanying text.
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pectations that have been diminished by close government regulation.29
The district court in Shoemaker held the New Jersey alcohol and
drug testing program constitutional under the pervasive regulation ex-
ception to the administrative search warrant requirement.3° It reasoned
that the pervasive regulation of the horse racing industry put jockeys on
notice that they would be required to comply with regulations that fur-
thered the state's interests in ensuring the safety and integrity of the
sport.31
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's de-
cision. 32 The appellate court's analysis of the fourth amendment issue in
Shoemaker, however, differed from the trial court's in one significant re-
spect: the court of appeals rested its approval of the drug testing pro-
gram on the state's interest in preventing corruption in racing. The
opinion did not mention enhanced safety, in regard to either the state's
interest in the regulations, 33 or the jockeys' legitimate expectations of
34
II. The Fourth Amendment's Administrative Search Warrant
Requirement and the Pervasive Regulation Exception
A. The Administrative Search Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment provides in part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched,
29. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. For an in-depth discussion of the adminis-
trative search warrant requirement and the pervasive regulation exception, see generally Note,
Constitutional Law-Warrantless Administrative Searches and the Two-Step Test of Donovan
v. Dewey, 56 TUL. L. REv. 1467 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Warrantless Sarches].
30. Shoemaker I, 619 F. Supp. at 1099-1100.
31. Id. at 1098-1100. On another fourth amendment issue-the absence of individualized
suspicion-the district court ruled that the regulations sufficiently circumscribed the discre-
tion of the state stewards in selecting the jockeys for the tests. Because all jockeys must take
the breath test daily, and under a daily lottery system each jockey has an equal chance of being
selected to give a urine specimen, "[t]he fair characterization of these tests is that they are
administered neutrally, with procedural safeguards substituting for lack of any individualized
suspicion." Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1103. See supra note 25.
32. Shoemaker II, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. Dec. 2,
1986) (No. 86-576).
33. "Frequent alcohol and drug testing is an effective means of demonstrating that per-
sons engaged in the horse racing industry are not subject to certain outside influences." Id. at
1142.
34. "When jockeys chose to become involved in this pervasively-regulated business and
accepted a state license, they did so with the knowledge that the Commission would exercise
its authority to assure public confidence in the integrity of the industry." Id.
and the persons or things to be seized."
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from "unreasonable gov-
ernment intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy."36
Courts determine the reasonableness of government intrusion by balanc-
ing the public interest in the intrusion against the individual's right to
freedom from arbitrary interference by government officials. 7 A search
is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless accompanied by a
valid search warrant,38 except in situations where requiring officials to
get a warrant would be impossible or would impede an important gov-
ernmental interest.39
The Supreme Court initially refused to extend the search warrant
requirement to inspections conducted by government regulatory entities.
In Frank v. Maryland," the Court held that a warrant was not necessary
before a city health inspector could enter a citizen's home to conduct a
search authorized by statute.41 The Court's justification was twofold:
first, it believed that the Fourth Amendment's search warrant require-
ment applied only to "searches for evidence to be used in criminal prose-
cutions;"'42 and second, the ordinance "strictly limited" the health
inspectors' discretion by requiring that they have valid grounds for suspi-
cion of a violation, that the health inspection be made during the day-
time, and that no forced entry occur.43 The Court noted in Frank that
the "inspection touch[ed] at most upon the periphery of the important
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 30 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
36. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
37. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1978); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
38. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). See supra note 27.
39. See, eg., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (search of a prison inmate's cell);
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (search on the high seas); United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (border search); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976) (search at a fixed checkpoint); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (search by consent); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (search of a perva-
sively regulated business); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (automobile search);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit).
40. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
41. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 12 § 120 (1950). This ordinance provides:
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance
exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day time,
and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free
examination, he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty
Dollars.
42. Frank, 359 U.S. at 365.
43. Id. at 366-67.
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interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
against official intrusion [and was] hedged about with safeguards
designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant,
and to cause only the slightest restriction on his claims of privacy."'
The Court also noted that Maryland had a long history of such inspec-
tions,a" and that the public had an interest in maintaining community
health in growing cities.46 Thus the Frank Court concluded that the
search warrant requirement did not apply to administrative inspections.
In Camara v. Municipal Court,' the Supreme Court again consid-
ered whether regulatory inspections should be exempt from the search
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Camara involved a
property owner charged with violating the San Francisco Housing
Code48 by refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence.
The lower court, relying on Frank, held that the ordinance authorizing
the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court,
however, overruled Frank, and rejected the city's contention that the
fourth amendment interests at stake in inspection cases are "periph-
eral."49 Instead, the Court stated that regulatory inspections are "signif-
icant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
and that such searches when authorized and conducted without a war-
rant procedure lack traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment
guarantees to the individual."5 ° The Court noted that fourth amendment
protection is not restricted to instances when an individual is suspected
of criminal behavior. 1 Additionally, the Court believed that statutory
safeguards "are no substitute for individualized review."52 Regarding
the public interest in maintaining community health, the Court stated
that the question is not whether this interest justifies a warrantless
search, but whether the burden of obtaining a warrant would frustrate
the purpose of the search. 3 The Court found that the warrant require-
ment did not frustrate enforcement of the housing code. 4
44. Id. at 367.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 372.
47. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
48. SAN FRANCISCO, CA., HOUSING CODE § 503 (1958). The ordinance provides:
Sec. 503 Right to enter building. Authorized employees of the City departments or
City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall,
upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times,
any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon
them by the Municipal Code ....
49. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
50. Id. at 534.
51. Id. at 530.
52. Id. at 533.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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In See v. City of Seattle,55 a companion case to Camara, the Court
extended the search warrant requirement to include the inspection of
commercial property by regulatory officials. Mr. See was a commercial
property owner who appealed his conviction for refusing to permit a rep-
resentative of the Seattle Fire Department to enter and inspect his com-
mercial warehouse without a warrant.5 6 The Court stated that "[t]he
businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right
to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his
private commercial property.
57
Thus, the administrative search warrant requirement extends fourth
amendment protection to regulatory inspections of a residence or a place
of business. Government agents who perform administrative inspections
must first establish probable cause and obtain a warrant if the individual
in possession of the property does not consent to their entry.
B. The Pervasive Regulation Exception to the Administrative Search
Warrant Requirement
1. Establishment of the Pervasive Regulation Exception
Three years after Camara, the Supreme Court created an exception
to the administrative search warrant requirement that applies to the in-
spection of commercial property. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States,58 the corporation challenged a warrantless search by Treasury
Department officials of a locked liquor storeroom. The officials con-
ducted the search pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless entries
and inspections of the commercial premises of retail dealers in liquors.5 9
55. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
56. Such inspections were authorized by a Seattle ordinance that reads as follows:
Inspection of Building and Premises. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect
and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as
often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected
any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title,
and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards.
Seattle, Wa., Ordinance 87870 § 8.01.050 (Jan. 19, 1959).
57. 387 U.S. at 543.
58. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
59. 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) (1970) (amended 1976) provides:
The Secretary or his delegate may enter during business hours the premises (in-
cluding places of storage) of any dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining
any records or other documents required to be kept by such dealer under this chapter
or regulations issued pursuant thereto and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or
stored by such dealer on such premises.
26 U.S.C. § 7606 (1970) (amended 1976) in part provides:
(a) Entry during day-The Secretary or his delegate may enter, in the daytime,
any building or place where any articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced,
or kept, so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or
objects.
(b) Entry at night-When such premises are open at night, the Secretary or his
delegate may enter them while so open, in the performance of his official duties.
Fall 19861 DRUG TESTING
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
The Court held the search constitutional. It stated that where Congress
has authorized inspections but has made no rules governing the proce-
dure inspectors must follow, the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment
apply." Where, however, an industry, such as the manufacture and dis-
tribution of liquor, has "long [been] subject to close supervision and in-
spection," Congress has broad power to design inspection procedures,
and thereby exclude that industry from the protection otherwise afforded
to commercial premises in the absence of Congressional guidelines.61
In United States v. Biswell,62 the Supreme Court expanded the per-
vasive regulation exception to include governmental inspections of the
firearms industry. In Biswell, federal agents enforcing the Gun Control
Act of 196863 conducted a warrantless search of the storeroom of a li-
censed weapons dealer. The Court balanced the federal interest in the
regulation of interstate firearms traffic against the individual's right to
privacy, and upheld the constitutionality of the search. The Court de-
clared that "large" 6 and "urgent"65 federal interests in preventing vio-
lent crime and assisting state regulation of firearms traffic require close
federal scrutiny of the firearms industry. 6 Moreover, a warrant require-
ment could easily frustrate effective inspection.67 In regard to the indi-
vidual's privacy interests, the Court conceded that "[flederal regulation
of the interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in history as is
governmental control of the liquor industry .... ,68 Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that recently imposed pervasive regulation of the fire-
arms industry provided sufficient notice of prospective warrantless in-
spection to firearms dealers to justify dispensing with the administrative
search warrant requirement:
Inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only
limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy.
When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated busi-
ness and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge
that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject
60. Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 77.
61. Id. at 76-77.
62. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
63. The Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-929 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). The Act autho-
rizes official entry during business hours as follows:
[Into] the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition im-
porter, manufacturer, dealer, or collector for the purpose of inspecting or examining
(1) any records or documents required to be kept.., and (2) any firearms or ammu-
nition kept or stored by such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector at such
premises.
Id. at § 923(g).
64. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315.
65. Id. at 317.
66. Id. at 315-16.
67. Id. at 316.
68. Id. at 315.
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to effective inspection. 69
Thus the Supreme Court established the pervasive regulation excep-
tion to the administrative search warrant requirement. While Colonnade
required that an industry have a long tradition of extensive government
control before the exception would apply, the Court in Biswell broadened
the pervasive regulation exception to include an industry only recently
subject to heavy regulation.7°
2. Scope of the Pervasive Regulation Exception
Initially, the Supreme Court foresaw limited application of the per-
vasive regulation exception.71 Although some lower courts narrowly
construed the exception, others, anticipating a broadening of the excep-
tion's scope after Biswell, applied the exception merely because a certain
industry was subject to pervasive regulation.72
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. ," the Supreme Court sought to clarify
the scope of the pervasive regulation exception. In Barlow's, the owner
of an electrical and plumbing installation business engaged in interstate
commerce sought an injunction against the warrantless inspection of his
business premises. Such inspections were authorized under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA").74 The government ar-
gued that because all businesses engaged in interstate commerce have
69. Id. at 316. The Biswell rationale for warrantless searches has been termed the "im-
plied consent" doctrine, because the firearms dealer knows before he enters the firearms indus-
try that his business will be subject to heavy regulation and constant inspection. See Lacek,
Camara, See and Their Progeny: Another Look at Administrative Inspections Under the Fourth
Amendment, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 61, 65-66, 71-72 (1979).
70. The initial rationale for the pervasive regulation exception was implied consent, see
supra note 69, yet elimination of the history of regulation requirement of Colonnade subjects
owners in newly regulated industries to warrantless searches even though the owners might
not have been aware at the time they formed their businesses that such searches would take
place. This result has been criticized. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 609-14 (1980)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Note, Warrantless Searches, supra note 29, at 1479.
71. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 611 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Note, Administrative Searches
and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 CORNELL L.
REv. 856, 867 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Administrative Searches].
72. Note, Administrative Searches, supra, note 71, at 867. See also Lacek, supra note 69,
at 72-73; McManis & McManis, Structuring Administrative Inspections: Is There Any Warrant
for a Search Warrant?, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 942, 953 (1977).
73. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
74. Section 8(a) of the Act reads:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon present-
ing appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is author-
ized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establish-
ment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is per-
formed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reason-
able times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place
of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices,
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long been subject to close regulation, the warrantless OSHA inspections
fell within the pervasive regulation exception. 75 In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Barlow's Court reasoned that regulation of interstate com-
merce did not provide notice to the owner such that he or she could be
considered to have voluntarily consented to later warrantless searches.76
The Court explained as follows:
Certain industries have such a history of government oversight
that no reasonable expectation of privacy ... could exist for a pro-
prietor over the stock of such an enterprise. Liquor (Colonnade)
and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entrepre-
neur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to
subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.
... The element that distinguishes these enterprises from ordi-
nary businesses is a long tradition of close government supervision,
of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must
already be aware .... "[T]he businessman in a regulated industry
in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him."
... The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated
industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the
exception.77
Thus the Court resurrected the Colonnade requirement that there be a
long history of close governmental supervision and inspection of the in-
dustry.78 Although the Barlow's Court spoke of privacy expectations, 79
the decision rested on an implied consent theory.80 Notably, the
Supreme Court applied its implied consent rationale only to the "proprie-
tor," "entrepreneur," "business[person]," and his or her "stock.""1
The Supreme Court further clarified the scope of the pervasive regu-
lation exception in Donovan v. Dewey. 2 The Dewey Court considered
whether warrantless inspections of underground and surface mines, as
equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer,
owner, operator, agent, or employee.
29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1982).
75. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313-14.
76. Id. at 314.
77. Id. at 313 (citations omitted) (quoting in part Almeida-Sanchez %'. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 271 (1973)).
78. See Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 77; see also supra text accompanying note 61.
79. The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy,
"that in certain places and certain times he has 'the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.'" Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758
(1985) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
80. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 611 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Note, Warrantless Searches, supra
note 29, at 1473. See also supra notes 69-70.
81. See supra text accompanying note 77.
82. 452 U.S. 594 (1980).
provided for in the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,83 violate
the Fourth Amendment. The Court, concluding that the mine searches
were reasonable, established the prevailing two-part test to determine
whether a particular search falls within the pervasive regulation
exception:
[1] [A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when Con-
gress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are nec-
essary to further a regulatory scheme and [2] the federal
regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that
the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that
his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for
specific purposes.8
4
In Dewey, the Court again discarded the requirement that there be a long
history of regulation in the subject industry85 and abandoned the related
"implied consent" doctrine.86 Instead, the Court employed "expectation
of privacy" language.87
Under the two-part Dewey test, a court must first deem reasonable a
legislative or administrative determination that a warrantless inspection
is necessary to enforce a governmental regulatory program, 88 and sec-
ondly, a court must determine whether the regulation of the trade or
business is sufficiently pervasive to notify a commercial property owner
that warrantless inspections of his or her property might take place.89
Significantly, the Dewey Court's privacy expectation language specifically
refers to owners and inspection of commercial property, and thereby par-
allels the Supreme Court's prior pervasive regulation cases. 90
83. Section 103(a), 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1982), authorizes mine inspectors to investigate
and inspect coal or other mines annually, and in performing these duties "no advance notice
of an inspection shall be provided to any person."
84. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600.
85. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 69-70.
87. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600. See also supra note 79.
88. See Note, Warrantless Searches, supra note 29, at 1476.
89. Id.
90. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600 (mine owners); 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1982) (authorizes inspec-
tion of mines) (supra note 83); Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313 (proprietors, entrepreneurs and busi-
nesspersons, and inspection of the "stock" of their enterprise) (supra note 77 and
accompanying text); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316 (firearms dealers); 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1982)
(authorizes the warrantless search of records, documents, firearms, and ammunition) (supra
note 63); Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 77 (retail liquor dealers); 26 U.S.C. § 146(b) (1970) (amended
1976) (permits the warrantless search of premises for records or other documents, distilled
spirits, beer, or wine) (supra note 59).
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III. Application of the Two-Part Dewey Test to Mandatory
Warrantless Alcohol and Drug Testing in the Horse
Racing Industry
A. Part One of the Dewey Test: The State's Interest in Mandatory
Warrantless Alcohol and Drug Testing
The first part of the Dewey test measures the strength of the govern-
mental interest in conducting warrantless inspections.9' Although in
Shoemaker the district court believed that the horse racing regulatory
scheme was based on the state interests in both the safety of jockeys and
the integrity of the industry, it approved the alcohol and drug testing
program primarily because of safety considerations:
IT]he state has a vital interest in ensuring that horse races are
safely and honestly run and that the public perceives them as so.
Safe racing promotes the "integrity" of the industry .... It is clear
that horse racing is a highly dangerous sport where injury to par-
ticipants is commonplace. A jockey must be in full possession of
his mental faculties and physical capabilities-his coordination,
skill, and reflex ability are critical to good performance.... In this
context, even a single jockey impaired by alcohol and drug use, and
participating in several races that evening, will ride proximate to
dozens of jockeys and increase the probability that all may be
injured.92
The court of appeals' fourth amendment analysis, however, justified the
tests based on the state's desire to prevent corruption, omitting any refer-
ence to safety considerations.93
To warrant application of the pervasive regulation exception the
search must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme.94 The scheme
behind pervasive regulation of horse racing was not meant to ensure the
safety of the sport. To the contrary, courts have recognized that the sole
objective behind pervasive regulation of the horse racing industry is to
prevent corruption. The district court was aware that "[t]he public has a
special interest in the strict regulation of horse racing [which] has always
been pervasively regulated, in order to minimize the criminal influence to
which it is so prone."9 A New Jersey state court wrote:
The danger of clandestine and dishonest activity inherent in
the business of horse racing has been well recognized. The busi-
ness itself and the legalized gambling which accompanies its activi-
ties are strongly affected by a public interest. Corruption in horse
91. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600; Shoemaker II, 795 F.2d at 1142. See supra text accompany-
ing note 84.
92. Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1102.
93. Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
94. See supra text accompanying note 84.
95. Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1099.
racing activities is regarded as an affront to a publicly sponsored
sport with the potential of far reaching consequences. Strict and
close regulation is therefore regarded as highly appropriate.9 6
The New Jersey Supreme Court in quoting the above language stated: "It
was doubtless with these important considerations in mind that the legis-
lature gave the Racing Commission full regulatory power over horse
racing in this state."' 97 Thus, only those regulations necessary to prevent
corruption further the purpose behind the pervasive regulation of horse
racing and comply with the first part of the Dewey test. To justify alco-
hol and drug testing on safety grounds places the search outside of the
pervasive regulation exception.
This interpretation is necessary to prevent bootstrapping by legisla-
tors or bureaucrats. Otherwise, a regulatory scheme authorizing war-
rantless searches for a limited purpose could become the basis for further
warrantless searches based on state interests that alone would not sup-
port an exception to the warrant requirement. To preserve the integrity
of the Fourth Amendment's administrative search warrant requirement,
warrantless searches used to enforce a regulatory scheme must serve par-
ticular well-established purposes. The Shoemaker district court's analy-
sis of the state's interest supporting the warrant exception fails to limit
the scope of the regulatory scheme. Instead, the court's construction al-
lows a regulatory scheme to expand with the passage of every new regu-
lation or every new state interest found by a court, both of which may be
unrelated to the rationale behind pervasive regulation of the subject in-
dustry. The permissible scope of warrantless searches based on a regula-
tory scheme could expand to the point where the first part of the Dewey
test provides little fourth amendment protection to participants in a per-
vasively regulated business.98
The court of appeals perhaps recognized this flaw in the district
court's analysis, and therefore rested its affirmance soley on the state's
interest in preventing corruption. 99 However, the appellate opinion is it-
self questionable. Dewey requires that the state make a reasonable deter-
mination that the warrantless searches are necessary to the regulatory
scheme: °° the warrantless searches must help prevent corruption in the
horse racing industry. Hypothetically, the consumption of alcohol or
drugs could diminish the jockeys' performance or subject them to black-
mail, but the state presented no evidence establishing a nexus between
alcohol or drug use and corruption, and failed to demonstrate that test-
96. Dare v. State, 159 N.J. Super. 533, 536-37, 388 A.2d 984, 985 (App. Div. 1978) (cita-
tion omitted).
97. Delguidice v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 100 N.J. 79, 90, 494 A.2d 1007, 1012
(1985) (citations omitted).
98. See Dewey, 452 U.S. at 611-12 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
99. See supra notes 33-34, 93 and accompanying text.
100. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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ing would reduce accidents. ' ° ' Without strong evidence that corruption
in horse racing follows from alcohol and drug use by jockeys, the court
should not have concluded that warrantless breath and urine tests are
necessary to prevent corruption. Moreover, the paucity of evidence indi-
cates that the Commission neglected to make a reasonable determination
that warrantless searches are necessary.
B. Part Two of the Dewey Test: The Alcohol and Drug Testing Program
and Legitimate Privacy Expectations
Even if horse racing were pervasively regulated for safety, or if there
were a nexus between alcohol or drug use and corruption, it does not
automatically follow that the alcohol and drug tests in Shoemaker were
constitutional. The second part of the Dewey test requires a court to
weigh the legitimate privacy expectations of the individual against the
state's interest in the searches: regulation must be "sufficiently compre-
hensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help
but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections un-
dertaken for specific purposes.""1 2 In weighing privacy expectations, the
Shoemaker court faced two questions: first, whether the court could ex-
tend a rule that specifically refers to owners and the inspection of com-
mercial property to include alcohol and drug testing of employees; 0 3 and
second, whether pervasive regulation had provided such notice that the
jockeys should have known they would be subject to warrantless alcohol
and drug testing for the specific purpose of preventing corruption."°4
1. Extending Diminished Privacy Expectations and the Areas
Subject to Search
The Supreme Court, in developing the pervasive regulation excep-
tion to the administrative search warrant requirement, found diminished
privacy expectations only among retail liquor dealers, firearms dealers,
101. The district court stated:
While the state has introduced little evidence linking accidents with jockeys im-
paired by alcohol or drugs-only one accident at a race track in Pennsylvania-the
court does not believe that this should be the critical and only factor in the analysis.
The state has shown that jockeys have been found in impaired states at the race track
in sufficient numbers to indicate a high probability that the testing program will
either uncover such use or deter it and thereby prevent accidents.
619 F. Supp. at 1102-03.
102. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600 (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note 84.
103. Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142; Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1100. The court of
appeals' holding is broad in terms of those employees it subjects to warrantless searches: "We
... hold that the administrative search exception applies to warrantless breath and urine test-
ing of employees in the heavily regulated horse-racing industry." Shoemaker II, 795 F.2d at
1142 (footnote omitted). The district court limited its holding to licensed race track employ-
ees. See Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1100. Jockeys are licensed employees of the horse
racing industry. See Shoemaker II1, 795 F.2d at 1142.
104. See Shoemaker I1, 795 F.2d at 1142; Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1099-1100.
proprietors, entrepreneurs or businesspersons, and owners. 10 5 By apply-
ing the exception to jockeys, the Shoemaker court included employees
within the classes of persons judicially recognized as having diminished
privacy expectations. Admittedly, pervasive regulation of a business may
reduce the privacy expectations of employees as well as owners. Never-
theless, the privacy expectations of these two classes of persons are not
necessarily equivalent. Regarding searches of premises, for example,
owners have a lesser expectation of privacy than employees because it is
the owners' commercial property and business effects that will be subject
to warrantless search. Pervasive regulation of a business would not di-
minish the legitimate privacy expectations of employees unless the regu-
latory scheme had informed them that they would be subject to
warrantless search. No language in the statutes that govern horse racing
provides such notice. 10 6 In the horse racing industry, therefore, ex-
tending the concept of diminished privacy expectations to employees is
questionable.
Additionally, the cases defining the scope of the pervasive regulation
exception have dealt exclusively with statutes authorizing searches of
commercial property, not persons. 10 7 Shoemaker, however, involved
"warrantless searches of persons on regulated property, not merely the
regulated property itself."' 1 8 The district court argued that the same con-
siderations behind the exception to the warrant requirement for property
searches are applicable to searches of licensed persons on regulated
premises.' 0 9 For authority the court cited In re Martin," where the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld warrantless searches of licensed ca-
sino employees. The Martin court reasoned that a casino employee's ex-
pectation of privacy is limited, particularly where applicants are notified
105. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
106. The statutes governing horse racing enacted by the New Jersey State Legislature, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5:5-22 to 5:5-121 (West 1973 & Supp. 1986), indicate only that warrantless
searches of property might take place:
The commission shall appoint a steward ... to serve at any horse race meeting
held under a permit issued under this act.... These officials ... shall have full and
free access to any portion of the space or enclosure where such horse race meeting is
held and shall have such powers and duties as the commission may from time to
time delegate to them under the provisions of this act.
Id. at § 5:5-37. Furthermore, the regulations promulgated by the Commission prior to enact-
ment of the alcohol and drug testing program only provide notice of warrantless property
search, as indicated by the court of appeals in Shoemaker: "Even before the regulations chal-
lenged here were adopted, the jockeys were aware that the Commission had promulgated regu-
lations providing for warrantless searches of stables." Shoemaker I, 795 F.2d at 1142. See
infra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
107. See generally supra notes 58-90 and accompanying text.
108. Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1100.
109. Id. The court of appeals apparently deemed the pervasive regulation exception appli-
cable to unlicensed as well as licensed employees. See supra note 103.
110. 90 N.J. 295, 447 A.2d 1290 (1982).
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prior to licensing that they will be subject to warrantless searches. 1'
And the court of appeals in Shoemaker stated:
[W]hile there are distinctions between searches of premises and
searches of persons, in the intensely-regulated field of horse racing,
where the persons engaged in the regulated activity are the princi-
ple regulatory concern, the distinctions are not so significant that
warrantless testing for alcohol and drug use can be said to be con-
stitutionally unreasonable. 12
Both analyses obscure important differences between inspection of
property and searches of persons. Under the Fourth Amendment, courts
must balance the public interest behind a warrantless search against an
individual's legitimate privacy expectations. 1 3 Logic dictates that the
greater the invasion of privacy, the more compelling must be the public
interest. Thus, a court must determine the "extent of intrusion upon the
individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integ-
rity." '114 The Supreme Court has recognized that an individual deserves
more protection in his or her home than on commercial premises," 5 and
that the privacy interest in one's body exceeds that in property." 6 Not
all searches of persons equally impinge on privacy. Searches that invade
bodily integrity, for example, affect greater fourth amendment interests
than do frisk searches."i 7 In this context, courts have correctly con-
cluded that urinalysis constitutes a highly intrusive search.' Further-
111. Id. at 314, 447 A.2d at 1299.
112. Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142.
113. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
114. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 761.
115. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 598-99.
116. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 760. Thus, in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Rabb, No. 86-3522 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 1986), the court stated: "Drug testing of...
workers' bodily wastes is even more intrusive than a search of a home."
117. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (bullet removal); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811 (1985) (seizure of person for fingerprints); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (finger-
prints); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (fingernail scrapings); United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sam-
ple); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forced stomach pump); see also supra note 27.
118. In determining the intrusiveness of the alcohol and drug tests, the Shoemaker district
court believed that "breathalyzer tests and urinalysis are considered less intrusive than body
cavity and strip searches." ShoemakerII, 619 F. Supp. at 1101. Furthermore, both the district
court and the court of appeals believed that the procedures specified in the regulations assured
that the tests would not be administered in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Shoemaker
II, 795 F.2d at 1143; Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1103. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 661 (1979) (random searches that do not limit the discretion of officials in the field violate
the Fourth Amendment). Other courts, however, have equated urinalysis with a body cavity
search. Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (D. Wis. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600
F. Supp. 1214, 1218-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Although procedural safeguards, such as privacy
while providing a sample and confidentiality of test results, might render a particular testing
program more reasonable than would be the case absent such protection, the fact remains that
the taking of a urine specimen is a substantial intrusion into personal privacy. In American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Weinberger, No. CV486-353 (S.D. Ga.
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more, drug tests are highly invasive because they can reveal to officials an
individual's activities outside the regulated facility.' 19 Therefore, alcohol
and drug testing in horse racing require demonstration of a more compel-
ling public interest than was needed for the casino search in Martin
(which also concerns the state interest in preventing corruption but in-
volved an inspection of the exterior of a person's body and personal ef-
fects present in the casino120 ) or the inspections in industries examined in
Supreme Court decisions that upheld use of the pervasive regulation ex-
ception. 121 Actual rather than potential corruption could constitute a
more compelling state interest that might have justified alcohol and drug
testing. New Jersey, however, failed to demonstrate that alcohol or drug
use by jockeys actually corrupted the horse racing industry. 22
2. Legitimate Privacy Expectations as a Limit on the Type of Searches
that May Be Performed
Assuming that the Shoemaker court legitimately expanded the per-
vasive regulation exception from inspections of property to include
searches of persons, the second part of the Dewey test still required the
court to determine whether pervasive regulation of horse racing so di-
minished privacy expectations that the jockeys could not help but be
aware they would be subject to warrantless testing for alcohol and drug
Dec. 2, 1986), the court described urinalysis as a "highly intrusive" search. Importantly, the
Weinberger court noted that administering a urine test in a reasonable manner does not negate
the fact that the search is a significant intrusion on the individual searched. Id. (citing Kirk-
patrick v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1986). Lastly, confidentiality under the
Commission's testing program is not absolute. If an employee tests positive, results may be
divulged in a ruling issued by the Commission, or in any administrative or judicial proceeding
concerning the ruling. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
119. Detectable traces of marijuana remain in the body for up to four weeks after consump-
tion. All other drugs remain in the body for as long as three days. THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 6,
1986, at 34. Thus, drug tests may monitor activities unrelated to job performance, far removed
from the job site by both time and location. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-
CIO v. Weinberger, No. CV486-353 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 1986). Additionally, drug testing poten-
tially affects privacy more than other searches because results are often unreliable. False indi-
cations of drug use, which are not uncommon, could cost innocent persons their jobs and
reputations. See Altman, Expensive Drug Tests Often Inaccurate, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1986,
at 11, col. 1.
120. Martin, 90 N.J. at 312, 447 A.2d at 1298. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-79(a)(6) (West
1973 & Supp. 1986).
121. See Dewey, 452 U.S. at 602 (safety of underground and surface mines); Biswell, 406
U.S. at 315 (regulation of interstate firearms traffic); Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 75-76 (protection
of liquor tax revenue).
122. See supra text accompanying note 101. Compare this analysis with that of the court
of appeals in Shoemaker, which reasoned that the state's interest in preventing the mere ap-
pearance of corruption rendered the warrantless alcohol and drug tests reasonable: "It is the
public's perception, not the known suspicion, that triggers the state's strong interest in con-
ducting warrantless testing." Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142.
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use to deter corruption.123 The district court reasoned that licensed par-
ticipants in a heavily regulated industry have limited expections of pri-
vacy, and because the jockeys are licensed and had received notice of the
testing regulations, the testing program did not infringe upon the jock-
eys' reasonable privacy expectations. 124 Although the court acknowl-
edged that licensure and notice do not constitute aper se waiver of fourth
amendment rights, "licensed participants in an industry subject to strict
oversight have a diminished expectation of privacy." '25 The court of ap-
peals also linked the jockeys' diminished privacy expectations to notifica-
tion that testing would take place.
126
The flaw in this analysis is that it links the privacy expectations of
jockeys to notice of an impending regulatory program. The Dewey test,
however, expressly states that the "regulatory presence," not newly
adopted regulations, must provide the notice which reduces privacy ex-
pectations.'27 If, within a pervasively regulated industry, notice of a new
regulatory program alone could diminish legitimate privacy expectations,
the state could gradually shrink the circle of privacy surrounding em-
ployees in a pervasively regulated industry by continually adopting new
regulatory agendas and announcing new searches; the fourth amendment
protection ostensibly provided by the second part of the Dewey test
would thereby disappear. 28
The extent that pervasive regulation of horse racing reduces jockeys'
legitimate privacy expectations must be determined. An industry perva-
sively regulated to prevent corruption does not sufficiently diminish pri-
vacy expectations to justify warrantless body searches in the interest of
safety. Furthermore, even if a jockey must expect to be scrutinized for
the specific purpose of deterring corruption, pervasive regulation does
not extend such scrutiny to include alcohol and drug testing. Without a
perceptible nexus between alcohol or drug use and corruption, 29 no
123. See supra text accompanying note 84.
124. Shoemaker II, 619 F. Supp. at 1102.
125. Id.
126. The court of appeals argued that, in the context of pervasive regulation, an announce-
ment that alcohol and drug testing would begin after a specified date provided sufficient notice
to the jockeys. Shoemaker III, 795 F.2d at 1142.
127. See supra text accompanying note 84.
128. For example, in Dewey Congress had specifically authorized the inspection of mines.
See supra note 83. The Dewey Court reasonably concluded, therefore, that pervasive regula-
tion had placed the mine owners on notice that their mines would be subject to warrantless
searches. 452 U.S. at 603-05. Pervasive regulation could not be viewed as having notified
mine owners that they themselves would be searched without a warrant. In the horse racing
industry, as with mining, the regulatory scheme only provided notice that inspection of prop-
erty might take place. See supra note 106. In both industries, an administrative agency's
newly adopted regulations that authorize searches of persons cannot be permitted to accom-
plish what a legislative body through pervasive regulation did not.
129. See supra text accompanying note 101.
jockey could have foreseen the implementation of an alcohol and drug
testing program.
Thus, the pervasive regulation of horse racing could not have dimin-
ished the privacy expectations of jockeys to the extent that they could not
help but be aware that they would be tested for alcohol and drugs, as
required by the second part of the Dewey test. 30 Both the district and
appellate courts impermissibly relied on newly promulgated regulations
to provide the requisite notice.
In sum, the facts in Shoemaker fail both parts of the Dewey test.
The district court's focus on safety placed the Commission's alcohol and
drug testing program beyond the regulatory scheme. Even if one accepts
the court of appeals' analysis, which justified the testing program on cor-
ruption grounds and thereby placed it squarely within the regulatory
scheme, the state did not demonstrate that the tests were necessary to
further that scheme. Additionally, the state did not demonstrate a suffi-
cient public interest to warrant expansion of the traditional application of
the pervasive regulation exception to include highly intrusive warrant-
less searches of employees, nor does pervasive regulation of the horse
racing industry diminish the legitimate privacy expectations of employ-
ees sufficiently to justify such searches. The testing program, therefore,
should not have been upheld.
IV. The Potential Impact of Shoemaker
The impact of Shoemaker extends well beyond the horse racing in-
dustry. Indeed, widespread alcohol and drug abuse13 ' and the increasing
reliance in our society on drug testing of government and private em-
ployees 132 underscores the potential applicability of the Shoemaker anal-
ysis. Under the court's expansive interpretation of the Dewey test, those
employed in heavily regulated private industries could face mandatory
warrantless alcohol and drug testing where such testing is not reasonable.
Shoemaker is problematic because it would allow government regulators
to impose a mandatory alcohol and drug testing program without prop-
erly considering both the purpose behind pervasive regulation of the sub-
ject industry and an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy.
Even under a correct Dewey analysis, it is questionable whether
government-sponsored warrantless alcohol and drug testing programs
could be upheld. For example, in the nuclear power 133  or
130. See supra text accompanying note 84.
131. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
133. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has not yet promulgated rules aimed at
preventing drug use by employees at licensed nuclear utility sites. The NRC has, however,
issued a Policy Statement to guide utilities in the design of "fitness for duty programs." See
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, POLICY STATEMENT ON FITNESS FOR DUTY OF Nu-
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airline'3 4 industries, government-mandated warrantless tests to ensure
public safety might appear reasonable. The public interest in safety is
strong, involving the protection of several million people, and the legiti-
mate privacy expectations of industry participants are diminished in the
realm of safety. However, it would be difficult for the state to demon-
strate that off-site alcohol and drug use in such industries has in fact
affected safety sufficiently to justify expansion of the pervasive regulation
exception to include highly intrusive body searches of employees.
Conclusion
The Fourth Amendment generally requires issuance of a warrant
prior to a search conducted by law enforcement agents, including regula-
tory inspections conducted by administrative officials. Administrative in-
spections in pervasively regulated industries constitute one exception to
the search warrant requirement. The Supreme Court defined the param-
eters of this exception in Donovan v. Dewey. Dewey's safeguards promise
that warrantless searches will occur only when necessary to further the
specific purposes of the pervasive regulatory scheme, and only when tol-
erated by legitimate privacy expectations. The issue in Shoemaker v.
Handel was whether mandatory warrantless alcohol and drug testing of
race horse jockeys fell within the pervasive regulation exception to the
administrative search warrant requirement. The Shoemaker court, in its
laudible effort to cope with the growing alcohol and drug abuse problem,
weakened Dewey's fourth amendment safeguards by failing to require the
state to demonstrate that the testing is necessary to deter corruption in
CLEAR POWER PLANT PERSONNEL (effective Aug. 4, 1986). The guidelines in part provide as
follows:
An acceptable fitness for duty program should at a minimum include the following
essential elements: . . . (1) A provision that the sale, use, or possession of illegal
drugs within the protected area will result in immediate revocation of access to vital
areas and discharge from nuclear power plant activities. The use of alcohol or abuse
of legal drugs within the protected area will result in immediate revocation of access
to vital areas and possible discharge from nuclear power plant activitics[;J (2) A pro-
vision that any other sale, possession, or use of illegal drugs will result in immediate
revocation of access to vital areas, mandatory rehabilitation prior to reinstatement of
access, and possible discharge from nuclear power plant activities!; and] (3) Effective
monitoring and testing procedures to provide reasonable assurance that nuclear
power plant personnel with access to vital areas are fit for duty.
Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
Although this Policy Statement is merely a recommendation, it went on to emphasize that
"[n]othing in this Policy Statement shall limit the authority of the NRC to conduct inspections
as deemed necessary or to take appropriate enforcement action when regulatory requirements
are not met." Id. at 8. If the NRC would some day require alcohol or drug testing of nuclear
power industry employees, such state involvement would implicate the Fourth Amendment,
and the Shoemaker analysis would apply.
134. The Federal Aviation Administration has considered adopting rules that would re-
quire airline pilots and certain other airline employees to undergo alcohol and drug testing.
See N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1986, at I, col. 4.
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horse racing, by unjustifiably expanding the exception's scope to include
employees and intrusive body searches, and by allowing newly promul-
gated regulations-instead of pervasive regulation-to define legitimate
privacy expectations. The pervasive regulation exception to the adminis-
trative search warrant requirement thus risks becoming the rule, threat-
ening the fourth amendment rights of employees in pervasively regulated
industries.
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